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It is argued that two observers with the same information may rightly disagree about
the probability of an event that they are both observing. This is a correct way of
describing the view of a lottery outcome from the perspective of a winner and from
the perspective of an observer not connected with the winner – the outcome is
improbable for the winner and not improbable for the unconnected observer. This
claim is both argued for and extended by developing a case in which a probabilistic
inference is supported for one observer and not for another, though they relevantly
differ only in perspective, not in any information that they have. It is pointed out,
 nally, that all probabilities are in this way dependent on perspective.
It has recently been argued in this journal that a case may be constructed in
which probabilities are observer-relative.1 In this article I attempt to
demonstrate that probability is always perspectival.2
Let me start with a question: When is it likely that an unlikely event has
occurred? This is a question with two importantly different answers. Firstly,
there may be what we could call the cases of ‘strained’ improbability.
Imagine that a coin, in only one sequence of tosses observed randomly by us,
has fallen heads many times, yet we are convinced by other extremely
powerful evidence that it would be even more improbable that the coin was
not fair than that a fair coin landed heads so many times in a row. In such
strained cases of improbability we have evidence that, if it is to be made
likely, forces us to accept that other evidence must have come about in a way
that was inherently unlikely to have happened.
Then there will be the cases of ‘relaxed’ improbability, in which the locally
improbable has actually been made probable for us from a certain perspective
because of a combination of the overall context and the conditions of our
observation. Imagine there are countless tossings of a fair coin. It must be
expected that in a sequence of countless tossings of a fair coin there will be
runs of 1000 consecutive heads. It will still be as unlikely as ever that any
randomly observed sequence of 1000 tosses within this process of countless
tossings will be all heads, and how many tosses there are overall will be
absolutely irrelevant to what happens in any such sequence of 1000 tosses. So
if these countless tosses had all been  lmed and we viewed a randomly
selected piece of  lm of just 1000 of these tosses, it would be incredibly
unlikely that this piece of  lm would show us all heads. But if we were
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presented with a  lm clip of 1000 consecutive heads that had been
deliberately snipped from the rest for the very reason that it was all heads,
the inherently unlikely event of our observing all heads with a fair coin would
have been rendered likely by the conditions of our observation. So a relaxed
case of improbability is one in which enough events have occurred so that the
locally unlikely has actually been made likely to have occurred, while our
freedom or direction in observing these events is adequate to have made it
likely that we observed the event in question.
That improbabilities can be either strained or relaxed makes probability
and probabilistic inference perspectival. For the same event can be
improbable for one observer and probable for another within the same
hypothesis because the condition under which one observer is viewing the
event would give the occurrence of such an event an unavoidably strained
improbability for him while the condition under which the other is viewing
the event would relax that improbability, would make the overall event
probable for him. Thus for the winner of a lottery the unlikely coincidence
between his entry and the winning entry makes the event of his winning
improbable, while for an uninvolved observer this is merely the event of
someone winning, an event which will actually be certain if there is bound to
be a winner. This perspectival effect can be obscured for us by the fact that the
circumstances of the usual lottery will force the winner to accept that
something unlikely for him has indeed occurred. Yet he may still rightly
describe the result as ‘unbelievable’ (as it would not at all be for an
uninvolved observer) and may at  rst have  irted with the idea that his
winning was a practical joke or a dream – he may have pinched himself –
though he  nally does believe it. And we may confusedly think that the
winner ought himself, like us, to regard his winning as not at all improbable.
We may think that re ection on the mere fact that it was likely, or even
certain, that someone was going to win ought to satisfy him, as well as it does
us, that nothing unexpected has happened. But we are mistaken if we think
this. There is for him in this an unavoidably strained improbability, while for
us any improbability in an entrant winning has been relaxed by the number of
entrants, or the guarantee of a win, and our stipulated lack of any independent
involvement with the winner.
But we can clearly see the force of improbability from such a winner’s
perspective (improbability completely undiminished by the fact that ‘some-
one had to win’) when we see that improbability supporting an inference for
him to an alternative hypothesis in a case that is free from the obscuring
factors of forced acceptance in the usual lottery.
Imagine a hotel with a million rooms. In the hotel lobby is a large urn
containing a million beads. Each of a million players takes a turn to draw one
bead from the urn without looking at it and keeps his bead in his clenched  st
till he gets to his own private room and shuts the door. Then, alone, he looks at
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the bead he has drawn. If the bead is blue, he is a winner. But he knows there
are two kinds of game. In the ‘hard’ game there would have been only one
blue bead among the million beads in the urn, and the prize would be large. In
the ‘easy’ game, every bead of the million would have been blue, and each of
the million winners would receive a much smaller prize.
Any of these players must regard himself as having a random sample
among the beads, since it was not somehow drawn out by him because it was
blue. He observes a bead that has the completely independent, random
designation that it was simply the one that he drew out. Now, in the hard game
a random sample of one of the beads was unlikely to have been blue, and the
sampler was therefore unlikely to be a winner (unlikely to the tune of one in a
million); but in the easy game the bead was bound to be blue and every player
a winner. Thus any player who  nds that his bead is blue, that he has won,
should  gure that the easy game was a million times more likely to be the one
he had played.3
If the hard game had been played, someone would still have drawn the blue
bead and been a winner. Yet that rare someone would then still have been
right to infer the greater likelihood that the easy game had been played; but in
doing so he would have been misled into thinking that the easy game actually
was the one that was played. The point is that it would have been enormously
unlikely that any randomly designated player (as any player must be for
himself) would have been that rare someone who was a winner in the hard
game, and thus it would have been enormously unlikely that any player, stuck
with just the bead that he drew, win or lose, would have had the blue bead in
his hand and therefore been in the position to make the rare misleading
inference to the easy game in the event of the hard game being played. This
inference has only a one in a million probability of misleading even in the
hard game, since to be so misled a player would have had to have drawn the
hard game’s one blue bead in a million. So no player should be bothered about
being the someone with the blue bead in the hard game. A player should think
that he could just be the someone with the blue bead in a hard game, but it’s
incredibly improbable that he is.
Next imagine an external observer who will be told of the result in just one
hotel room that has been selected in some way that is random relative to
whether it contains a winner. If this observer hears that the occupant of that
room has a blue bead, he ought to infer the likelihood of the easy game having
been played. For he is in the same position regarding these probabilities as the
room’s occupant, since both are connected with a bead in that urn in a way
that designated it randomly relative to its being blue. The hard game
hypothesis would make highly improbable the evidence that is known to both
this external observer and that one player. Hence both can infer that it is
unlikely that what they know has resulted from the hard game.
But now imagine that an external observer is going to be told about what
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happens in only the room of a single winner no matter which game has been
played. Then this guaranteed observer of a winner, unlike either the external
or the internal random observer, cannot use his news of a winning player,
guaranteed as it is in either game, to infer any greater likelihood that one
game was played rather than the other. He would be hearing about a blue bead
and a winner either way. Yet, if he is told about the winner’s inference that the
easy game had been played, he can totally sympathize with that inference; he
should agree that that inference should indeed be made from that position; but
he cannot himself join that winner in making it. For he has learned about this
evidence under the wrong conditions for it to constitute the random sample
that he would need for making that inference.
Now imagine that there are, in the million rooms of a second hotel, a
million guaranteed observers, each isolated in his own room and looking at
(and listening to) a winner of the game on a television receiver. If the hard
game is played, each observer will be viewing the same single winner. If the
easy game is played, each will be viewing a different one of the million
winners.
One of these observers sees a winner looking into the camera and hears him
say:
I can’t know for certain whether I am the single lucky winner of the hard game
addressing a million guaranteed observers or just one of a million winners addressing
the one guaranteed observer who happens to be watching me in the easy game. But I
must infer, given what I do know, the far greater likelihood of the easy game having
been played because that makes what I am observing, my winning, much more likely
to have happened from my perspective. But I realize that this must be an ‘egocentric’
inference, to be made by me (and by any other winner) for myself (or for himself)
alone. I realize that though you see this very same winning that I see, this same blue
bead I am now holding to the camera, you cannot use this as evidence for the playing
of the easy as opposed to the hard game. For you see me and this bead under a
crucially different condition from that under which I see myself. I see myself simply
as myself, win or lose. You see me only as a winner, in a way that is not random
relative to that which makes different the two hypotheses about the game.
And the viewer must agree; this winner, whether he is the single lucky
winner of the hard game or merely one of the million of the easy game, is
absolutely right to infer that the easy game is the one that was likely to be
played. It is the likely game from that perspective. But this guaranteed
observer, though he has no information that could change the mind of that
winner, still cannot adopt as his own the inference he endorses for the other.
(Why have I bothered to restrict communication between the winner and
any observer of him to a one-way television broadcast? The answer is that I
wished to eliminate extraneous grounds for inference to the hard or the easy
game based on the winner’s consideration of the number of those who are
observing him. If he was the winner in the hard game, he could of course
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know this if a million observers were communicating with him. If the easy
game was played, he could know this too if he found himself observed by only
one observer. But why have I made the observers number a million rather than
one? If there were only one observer of the game – and he knew this – then he
would be in possession of information that would disturb the inference of the
winner he observes if that winner was to have that information. For the single
observer would know that something improbable would have occurred – not
for him but for the winner he observed – in case the easy game had been
played: that this winner would have been selected as the only one observed by
the single observer. In the case as I described it above, however, none of the
million observers individually possesses any information that the winner
observed by him could have used to change his inference. And yet, as we’ve
seen, a player and an observer who do thus share each other’s evidence are
prevented by their difference in perspective from joining together in making
that inference.)
Let me stress that though our hotel inference is perspectival it is not in any
sense merely subjective. It is objectively true, in terms of the frequency of
events, that the player in this game is unlikely, from his perspective, to be a
winner in the hard game. And it is equally objectively true that the guaranteed
observer is as likely to  nd a winner in one kind of game as in the other.
Let me add that any event has at least potential perspectives attached to it
that would make that event improbable for possessors of those perspectives. If
a single card is selected from a deck, for example, there is nothing improbable
in that event for the uninvolved observer. But if the card itself were somehow
conscious, that card itself would rightly  nd the selection of only it an
unlikely coincidence. The card itself could infer, if the hypothesis were
available to it, the likelihood that more than one card was selected. For this
would make the event of its having been selected less improbable from its
perspective. But since for the uninvolved observer the selection of any one
card was not at all improbable, for him no inference to either a one-card or a
many-card hypothesis could be supported by this evidence.
NOTES
1 John Leslie, ‘Observer-relative Chances and the Doomsday Argument’, Inquiry 40 (1997),
pp. 427–36. I think Leslie’s claim of observer relativity is based on a fallacy, but that is not
my concern in this paper.
2 The account I give here echoes a discussion in an earlier paper focused mainly on Personal
Identity (‘One Self: The Logic of Experience’ , Inquiry 33 [1990], pp. 39–68).
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3 We could make the prior probabilities for this inference equal by adding the knowledge that
which kind of game is played is decided by a single toss of a fair coin.
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